Central African Republic president launches crypto initiative following Bitcoin adoption

Faustin-Archange Touadéra, pres­i­dent of the Cen­tral African Repub­lic, has announced the gov­ern­ment will be back­ing an ini­tia­tive cen­tered around devel­op­ing the country’s blockchain infrastructure.In a Mon­day announce­ment on Twit­ter, Touadéra said the CAR gov­ern­ment would be launch­ing San­go, a cryp­to ini­tia­tive pro­posed fol­low­ing the country’s adop­tion of Bit­coin (BTC) as legal ten­der in April. Accord­ing to Sango’s web­site, the gov­ern­ment intends to launch the pro­gram dur­ing a July 3 event in which the pres­i­dent, mem­bers of his cab­i­net and indus­try experts will dis­cuss the phys­i­cal and dig­i­tal infra­struc­ture need­ed for the CAR to enter the cryp­to space, as well as the legal frame­work for the coun­try. The San­go project’s plans include build­ing a “legal cryp­to hub” aimed at attract­ing busi­ness­es and glob­al cryp­to-enthu­si­asts, expand­ing the adop­tion of Bit­coin in the coun­try, and cre­at­ing a vir­tu­al “cryp­to island” — a spe­cial eco­nom­ic zone in the meta­verse that will seem­ing­ly have an equiv­a­lent space in the phys­i­cal world. Accord­ing to San­do, the CAR plans to have a ded­i­cat­ed legal frame­work for cryp­to in place by the end of 2022.“The ambi­tious strat­e­gy to quick­ly build a suc­cess­ful econ­o­my can only rely on new tech­nolo­gies that have tak­en the world by storm and tak­en mon­ey to anoth­er lev­el, with Bit­coin as a watch­word,” said Touadéra. With #Bit­coin as #legal­tender & inspi­ra­tion, our coun­try opens a new chap­ter in its inspir­ing jour­ney towards a brighter future via #blockchain #tech. Every­one is wel­come to wit­ness the San­go Gen­e­sis Event that will be broad­cast on the 3rd of July, on https://t.co/LIQiKGhcBS. pic.twitter.com/7u6knv5f6w— Faustin-Archange Touadéra (@FA_Touadera) June 27, 2022Related: Cryp­to users in Africa grew by 2,500% in 2021: ReportTouadéra’s and the CAR’s plans to adopt cryp­to seem to be emu­lat­ing those of El Sal­vador, whose Bit­coin Law declar­ing the dig­i­tal cur­ren­cy legal ten­der went into effect in Sep­tem­ber 2021. The Latin Amer­i­can nation also announced plans to cre­ate its town Bit­coin City fund­ed by $1 bil­lion worth of BTC bonds, placed on hold as of June amid the bear market.

The Brewing Battle Over Africa’s Ivory

https://foreignpolicy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/1‑horizontal-Africa-Zimbabwe-ivory-GettyImages-1231775327.jpg HWANGE, Zimbabwe—Fourteen years since the last legal com­mer­cial sale of ivory, south­ern African coun­tries are lob­by­ing to sell tons of tusks held in stor­age. As these states sub­mit pro­pos­als to the Unit­ed Nations Con­ven­tion on Inter­na­tion­al Trade in Endan­gered Species of Wild Fau­na and Flo­ra (CITES) sum­mit in Novem­ber, the fate of African ivory…

The small African state of Somaliland legally doesn’t exist. But Taiwan has spied an … — ABC

“It’s a secret,” smiles Allen C Lou, when asked how many Tai­wanese per­son­nel are based in Hargeisa, cap­i­tal of the unrecog­nised state of Soma­liland in the Horn of Africa.Taiwan is com­mit­ted to recog­nis­ing the de fac­to state and Lou is Taipei’s chief diplo­mat. But he is coy about just how sub­stan­tial Taipei’s diplo­mat­ic del­e­ga­tion real­ly is.On social media and in con­ver­sa­tion, he casu­al­ly embraces the title of ambas­sador. Yet giv­en the ambigu­ous polit­i­cal sta­tus of Soma­liland, his host coun­try, Lou is mind­ful to point out that his offi­cial title is mere­ly “representative”.But no mat­ter the size of Tai­wan’s pres­ence in Soma­liland, Taipei’s alliance with this unrecog­nised state has been steadi­ly build­ing since August 2020.

West African leaders put off further post-coup sanctions | Star Tribune

ACCRA, Ghana — West African heads of state put off fur­ther pun­ish­ing the lead­ers of Mali, Guinea and Burk­i­na Faso at a region­al sum­mit Sat­ur­day, as coup lead­ers in all three coun­tries con­tin­ue to insist that it will take years before new elec­tions can be held.

The 15-nation region­al bloc known as ECOWAS will con­vene again on July 3 before deter­min­ing if fur­ther sanc­tions will be imple­ment­ed in the three sus­pend­ed mem­bers states, ECOWAS Com­mis­sion Pres­i­dent Jean-Claude Kas­si Brou said.

ECOWAS already imposed strong eco­nom­ic sanc­tions against Mali back in Jan­u­ary — shut­ting down most com­merce, along with land and air bor­ders with oth­er coun­tries in the bloc. Those mea­sures have crip­pled Mal­i’s econ­o­my, prompt­ing con­cern about the human­i­tar­i­an con­se­quences on Malians.

The sanc­tions have not yet brought about a polit­i­cal break­through either: In the months since, Col. Assi­mi Goi­ta has only fur­ther iso­lat­ed the coun­try inter­na­tion­al­ly, pulling out of a region­al secu­ri­ty force and also shut­ting down two lead­ing French media broadcasters.

Goita’s gov­ern­ment also still insists that no vote can be held until 2024, which would extend their time to pow­er to near­ly four years despite orig­i­nal­ly agree­ing to an 18-month tran­si­tion back to democracy.

The jun­tas in Guinea and Burk­i­na Faso also have pro­posed three-year tran­si­tions, which have been reject­ed by ECOWAS as too long a wait for new elections.

The wave of mil­i­tary coups began in August 2020, when Goi­ta and oth­er sol­diers over­threw Mal­i’s demo­c­ra­t­i­cal­ly elect­ed pres­i­dent. Nine months lat­er, he car­ried out a sec­ond coup when he dis­missed the coun­try’s civil­ian tran­si­tion­al leader and became pres­i­dent himself.

Muti­nous sol­diers deposed Guinea’s pres­i­dent in Sep­tem­ber 2021, and Burk­i­na Faso’s leader was oust­ed in yet anoth­er coup in the region back in January.

The polit­i­cal upheaval came at a time when many observers were start­ing to think that mil­i­tary pow­er grabs were a thing of the past in West Africa: Mali had gone eight years with­out one, while Guinea had made it 13 years.

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Asso­ci­at­ed Press writ­ers Krista Lar­son in Dakar, Sene­gal, Baba Ahmed in Bamako, Mali; and Boubacar Dial­lo in Conakry, Guinea contributed.

W.H.O Predicts Steep Drop in Covid Deaths in Africa in 2022

https://static01.nyt.com/images/2022/06/02/multimedia/02virus-briefing-africa-who2/02virus-briefing-africa-who2-moth-v2.jpg The World Health Orga­ni­za­tion expects the num­ber of Covid-19 deaths in its Africa region to fall sharply this year, com­pared with 2021, the agency said on Thurs­day. The pre­dic­tion was a hope­ful one for the world’s least vac­ci­nat­ed con­ti­nent, though it reflect­ed a vast under­count­ing of past coro­n­avirus infec­tions and deaths in offi­cial tallies.…

Will France’s Africa Policy Hold Up?

Sum­ma­ry Dur­ing his first term, French Pres­i­dent Emmanuel Macron sought to revi­tal­ize his country’s diplo­mat­ic out­reach to coun­tries through­out Africa. Some aspects of this piv­ot were designed to more direct­ly address the lega­cy of French colo­nial­ism in Fran­coph­o­ne coun­tries. He also sensed that the grow­ing stature of non-West­­ern pow­ers like Chi­na has giv­en African counterparts…

How Russia’s Wagner Group Is Expanding in Africa

https://static01.nyt.com/images/2022/05/23/world/00wagner-explainer‑1/00wagner-explainer-1-moth.jpg Best known for its mer­ce­nar­ies, the Wag­n­er Group also mines dia­monds, spreads dis­in­for­ma­tion and props up auto­crats in an effort to grow Russia’s foot­print. Mer­ce­nar­ies are enjoy­ing a resur­gence in Africa, hired to fight in some of the continent’s most intractable con­flicts. Per­haps the most famous out­fit is the Wag­n­er Group, a neb­u­lous network…

Putin’s World Order Would Be Devastating for Africa

https://foreignpolicy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/RUSSIA-AFRICA-WAR-GettyImages-1235921645.png On March 2, mem­ber states of the Unit­ed Nations Gen­er­al Assem­bly vot­ed over­whelm­ing­ly in favor of a res­o­lu­tion that strong­ly con­demned Russ­ian Pres­i­dent Vladimir Putin’s war of aggres­sion against Ukraine. The res­o­lu­tion, which was sup­port­ed by 141 mem­ber states, affirmed that “any attempt aimed at the … dis­rup­tion of the ter­ri­to­r­i­al integri­ty of a…

New EU military missions in West Africa to counter Russia — EUobserver

The EU is aim­ing to launch three new mil­i­tary mis­sions in West Africa after Rus­sia pushed Europe out of the Cen­tral African Repub­lic (CAR) and Mali and threat­ens to do so in Burk­i­na Faso. The new mis­sions ought to be in Burk­i­na Faso, one of the Gulf of Guinea states, and in Niger accord­ing to a “strate­gic review” paper by the EU for­eign ser­vice dat­ed 25 May and seen by EUobserver. 

Niger slat­ed to host EU mil­i­tary train­ing mis­sion (Pho­to: Jean Rebiffe)

The Niger mis­sion is the first to go ahead after Nige­rien author­i­ties request­ed an EU “logis­tic and main­te­nance cen­tre of excel­lence in the vicin­i­ty of Niamey”, it said.

But the EU is keen “to go beyond this ini­tial request to also cov­er a ‘train, equip and accom­pa­ny’ pack­age for spe­cif­ic units or even a full-scale mil­i­tary oper­a­tion to accom­pa­ny Nige­rien armed forces to combat”. 

Burk­in­abe armed forces “dur­ing dis­cus­sions at tech­ni­cal lev­el” asked the EU for a sim­i­lar pack­age, the EU for­eign ser­vice said. 

But Burk­i­na Faso is play­ing a dou­ble game, because it also sent a high-lev­el mil­i­tary del­e­ga­tion to Mali in mid-April and the EU sus­pects it dis­cussed using Russ­ian mer­ce­nar­ies to fight jihadists the same way Mali has done. 

“The pos­si­bil­i­ty of a repli­ca­tion of the Malian mod­el [in Burk­i­na Faso] and the use of Rus­sia-affil­i­at­ed forces can­not be ruled out,” the EU for­eign ser­vice warned. 

The Gulf of Guinea project is in its infancy. 

But the EU for­eign ser­vice spoke of cre­at­ing “a lim­it­ed mil­i­tary foot­print in one iden­ti­fied coastal state” that would host EU mil­i­tary train­ers who could car­ry out “bespoke” mis­sions in the region. 

The EU mil­i­tary expan­sion comes after Rus­sia pushed out French-led Euro­pean forces from CAR last year and then Mali this year in what is increas­ing­ly look­ing like an African front in Rus­si­a’s geopo­lit­i­cal clash with the West.

The EU also hopes to cre­ate its own rapid reac­tion force by 2025 designed to fight in places such as the Sahel in what French pres­i­dent Emmanuel Macron has cham­pi­oned as Europe’s “strate­gic autonomy”. 

The new EU force must be ready to go into com­bat to defend Europe’s inter­ests, the EU for­eign ser­vice paper said. 

EU coun­tries must “accept the risks asso­ci­at­ed with clos­er accom­pa­ni­ment of part­ner forces clos­er to the com­bat zone”, it said.

But for all Macron and the EU for­eign ser­vice’s talk, Russ­ian pres­i­dent Vladimir Putin’s push into Françafrique risks mak­ing the EU ambi­tions appear like too lit­tle too late. 

The EU fold­ed its CAR mis­sion in Decem­ber 2021 after Krem­lin-linked mer­ce­nar­ies from the Wag­n­er group took com­mand of EU-trained sol­diers and com­mit­ted atrocities. 

It also sus­pend­ed its Mali mil­i­tary and civil­ian train­ing mis­sions in May after Mali brought in Wag­n­er mer­ce­nar­ies to fight jihadists. 

Rep­u­ta­tion damage

The EU pull-back was due “to pre­vent any rep­u­ta­tion­al risk due to Malian defence and secu­ri­ty forces trained by the EU falling under the con­trol or engag­ing along of Rus­sia-affil­i­at­ed forces, as it had been observed in the cen­tre of the coun­try”, the EU for­eign ser­vice said.

The EU had fund­ed new mil­i­tary camps in Kon­na, Tomin­ian, Timis­sa, Sayed, and Kori­entze in cen­tral Mali and trained sol­diers and gen­darmes there in the past two years, the EU paper noted. 

But “the units (both Nation­al Guard and Nation­al Gen­darmerie) in these posts, which were trained by EUCAP Sahel Mali [the EU mis­sion] pri­or to their deploy­ment, are now under mil­i­tary com­mand and are inte­grat­ed in joint oper­a­tions with Rus­sia-affil­i­at­ed forces,” the EU paper noted. 

“It is also assessed that Rus­sia-affil­i­at­ed forces are grad­u­al­ly more present and influ­en­tial at the strate­gic lev­el” in Malian mil­i­tary cir­cles, the EU warned. 

And now Malian sol­diers “togeth­er with Rus­sia-affil­i­at­ed forces” were “ter­ror­is­ing the pop­u­la­tion with puni­tive raids, tar­get­ing the Fulani com­mu­ni­ty in par­tic­u­lar”, the EU said. 

“Reports of vio­lence on civil­ians have reached unprece­dent­ed lev­els,” it said. “It is evi­dent that Rus­sia-affil­i­at­ed forces’ pres­ence along­side the MAF [Malian Armed Forces] coin­cides with seri­ous and sys­tem­at­ic human rights violations”. 

The few EU mil­i­tary and civil­ian train­ers who are stay­ing on in Mali will do so to main­tain some con­tact with Malian mil­i­tary com­man­ders and keep an eye on Russ­ian deployments. 

“It is assessed that about 1,000 Rus­sia-affil­i­at­ed per­son­nel, most­ly rely­ing on Malian equip­ment, are deployed in Mali, with a notable pres­ence in Sévaré, Ségou, Niono, Tim­buk­tu and Gos­si in MAF camps,” the EU for­eign ser­vice said. 

“Air Base 101, in Bamako, is used as a logis­ti­cal hub for their deploy­ment,” it added. 

Wag­n­er’s pres­ence was accom­pa­nied by a dis­in­for­ma­tion cam­paign which aimed at “deflect­ing atten­tion from Rus­sia-affil­i­at­ed forces atroc­i­ties against civil­ians” and con­tained anti-French “pan-African­ist” ide­ol­o­gy, it noted.

And all that was tak­ing place amid poten­tial­ly lucra­tive Malian min­er­al reserves as well as dire pover­ty and inse­cu­ri­ty for ordi­nary peo­ple — 6 mil­lion of whom need­ed food aid in a coun­try where one in five schools are closed. 

Not enough

Look­ing back to CAR, the coun­try has become so close­ly tied to Rus­sia that it now teach­es Russ­ian in its schools and offered Putin to send fight­ers to Ukraine. 

But if the Russ­ian leader want­ed to ful­ly repli­cate his CAR suc­cess in Mali, he might have to com­mit more resources than at present, the EU for­eign ser­vice said. 

Jihadist attacks against Malian camps in March and April showed that “around 1,000 Rus­sia-affil­i­at­ed forces along with the MAF are not enough to clear and hold the cen­tre of the coun­try”, the EU paper noted. 

“The sus­tain­abil­i­ty of the Russ­ian sup­port to Mali in the cur­rent glob­al envi­ron­ment is also ques­tion­able,” the EU added, refer­ring to Putin’s mil­i­tary loss­es on his pri­ma­ry bat­tle­fields in Ukraine.

How the West Lost Africa

https://foreignpolicy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/Mali-Russia-protest-GettyImages-1240644471.jpgWel­come to For­eign Pol­i­cy’s Africa Brief. The high­lights this week: Tunisia’s largest trade union calls a strike over wages, a politi­cian in Alge­ria seeks to crim­i­nal­ize nor­mal­iza­tion of rela­tions with Israel, and the Meroe pyra­mids in Sudan are dig­i­tized. If you would like to receive Africa Brief in your inbox every Wednes­day, please sign up here.…