African nations eye debt-for-climate swaps as IMF takes an interest

Cli­mate vul­ner­a­ble nations in Africa are show­ing grow­ing inter­est in debt-for-cli­mate swaps to address bal­loon­ing debt and spur cli­mate invest­ments. Increas­ing­ly, they have the ear of finan­cial institutions.Today, 58% of the world’s poor­est coun­tries are in debt dis­tress or at high risk of it. In sub-Saha­ran Africa, Covid-19 has squeezed bud­gets and pushed aver­age debt lev­els above 60% of GDP.
Helene Gichen­je is the Commonwealth’s region­al cli­mate finance advis­er for Africa. Russia’s war in Ukraine and ris­ing glob­al infla­tion “are like­ly to sig­nif­i­cant­ly wors­en the debt cri­sis,” she said at Africa Cli­mate Week in Gabon on Wednesday.
High lev­els of debt repay­ments and a shrink­ing fis­cal space have pre­vent­ed much-need­ed invest­ments in cli­mate resilience, Gichen­je said. And cli­mate vul­ner­a­bil­i­ty is dri­ving up the cost of access­ing capital.
“There is dan­ger that the vul­ner­a­ble devel­op­ing coun­tries will enter a vicious cycle,” she said.
The IMF, the Green Cli­mate Fund and the African Devel­op­ment Bank increas­ing­ly sup­port debt-for-cli­mate swaps as a solution.
Nige­ria plans gas-led tran­si­tion to full ener­gy access and net zero emissions
Debt swaps mean that instead of mak­ing pay­ments to cred­i­tors on out­stand­ing loans, debtor coun­tries can use that mon­ey in local cur­ren­cy to invest in cli­mate projects under terms agreed with creditors.
This form of debt relief has been around for 30 years but hasn’t seen much use. Despite some pos­i­tive exam­ples, includ­ing a debt-for-nature swap in the Sey­chelles, the IMF esti­mates that only up to $4bn worth of debt has been for­giv­en under swap programmes.
Fis­cal space
Cabo Verde, Eswa­ti­ni and Kenya are among nations look­ing into how to make debt-for-cli­mate swaps work for them.
“Debt swaps could be a good instru­ment to give us space in our bud­get for new invest­ments in renew­able ener­gy and the blue and green econ­o­my,” Soeli San­tos, trea­sury direc­tor at Cabo Verde’s min­istry of finance, told the event.
In exchange for par­tial debt for­give­ness, Cabo Verde would, for exam­ple, meet some of the com­mit­ments made in its 2030 cli­mate plan, San­tos said.
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The prin­ci­ple gen­er­at­ed sig­nif­i­cant inter­est dur­ing a meet­ing of African cli­mate experts in Ethiopia last month as part of dis­cus­sion on cli­mate finance.
The Egypt­ian Cop27 pres­i­den­cy is con­sid­er­ing launch­ing a debt swap frame­work at the cli­mate sum­mit in November.
And a num­ber of finan­cial insti­tu­tions have start­ed to explore how to scale up the relief swaps can provide.
IMF guidance
Last month, an IMF work­ing paper, co-authored by the fund’s deputy chief in the debt depart­ment, con­clud­ed that, in some cir­cum­stances, debt-for-cli­mate swaps made eco­nom­ic sense.
“There is a space for debt-for-cli­mate swaps in the broad­er cli­mate finance toolk­it,” said IMF senior econ­o­mist Vimal Thakoor. “In many coun­tries, grants are not forth­com­ing nec­es­sar­i­ly and debt relief is not nec­es­sar­i­ly on the table either.”
How­ev­er, in coun­tries with high lev­els of debt dis­tress, swaps should not replace broad­er debt restruc­tur­ing pro­grammes, the paper argues.
Scal­ing up debt swaps requires bring­ing on board a large pool of pri­vate and offi­cial coun­try cred­i­tors. That is no small task but some­thing cred­i­tors might be will­ing to do to sup­port cli­mate goals, it added.
G20 Bali meet­ing high­lights Indonesia’s weak cli­mate action
Although the paper hasn’t been endorsed by the IMF’s board and man­age­ment, Paul Steele, chief econ­o­mist at the Inter­na­tion­al Insti­tute for Envi­ron­ment and Devel­op­ment (IIED), told Cli­mate Home it could be “poten­tial­ly game-chang­ing” should it gain polit­i­cal backing.
“The IMF has the cred­i­bil­i­ty and the most lever­age to bring togeth­er cred­i­tors in a way that would allow them to take for­ward this kind of inter­na­tion­al ini­tia­tive,” he said. “An inter­na­tion­al ini­tia­tive on debt swaps for cli­mate and nature out­comes at Cop27 could break the log­jam on cli­mate finance.”
The IMF is not alone in explor­ing options to move this forward.
Andrey Chicherin, head of inno­va­tion and tech­nol­o­gy trans­fer at the Green Cli­mate Fund, told the meet­ing that the fund could act as an inter­me­di­ary in debt swaps by design­ing adap­ta­tion and car­bon-cut­ting pro­grammes and ensure their deliv­ery against the fund’s ver­i­fi­ca­tion sys­tems and safeguards.
The African Devel­op­ment Bank is final­is­ing a fea­si­bil­i­ty study on scal­ing up debt-for-cli­mate and nature swaps in Africa. This is to inform advice to nations on debt relief options.

South Africa’s Ramaphosa and US’s Biden to meet amid Russian war — Al Jazeera

Biden and Ramaphosa, who spoke by phone in April, are expect­ed to focus their talks on trade and invest­ment, infra­struc­ture, cli­mate and ener­gy, among oth­er issues.South African Pres­i­dent Cyril Ramaphosa and Unit­ed States Pres­i­dent Joe Biden will meet on Sep­tem­ber 16, the White House has announced.
Thursday’s announce­ment comes as the admin­is­tra­tion looks to draw African nations clos­er to the US at a time when South Africa and many of its neigh­bours have staked out neu­tral ground on Russia’s inva­sion of Ukraine.
Last month, US Sec­re­tary of State Antony Blinken said the Biden admin­is­tra­tion sees Africa’s 54 nations as “equal part­ners” in tack­ling glob­al prob­lems, dur­ing a vis­it to South Africa.
But the admin­is­tra­tion has been dis­ap­point­ed that South Africa and much of the con­ti­nent have declined to fol­low the US in con­demn­ing the Russ­ian inva­sion of Ukraine.
South Africa abstained in a Unit­ed Nations vote to con­demn Russia’s action, and Ramaphosa has avoid­ed any crit­i­cism of Rus­sia and has instead called for a medi­at­ed peace.
Biden and Ramaphosa, who spoke by phone in April, are expect­ed to focus their talks on trade and invest­ment, infra­struc­ture, cli­mate and ener­gy, pub­lic health and South Africa’s lead­ing role on the con­ti­nent, offi­cials said.
“The two Pres­i­dents will reaf­firm the impor­tance of our endur­ing part­ner­ship, and dis­cuss our work togeth­er to address region­al and glob­al chal­lenges,” White House press sec­re­tary Karine Jean-Pierre said in a state­ment announc­ing this month’s meeting.
Biden also plans to host a US-Africa lead­ers’ sum­mit in December.
Dur­ing the Blinken vis­it, for­eign min­is­ter Nale­di Pan­dor main­tained South Africa’s neu­tral­i­ty in the Ukraine war. In a press brief­ing fol­low­ing the meet­ing, Pan­dor accused the US and oth­er West­ern pow­ers of focus­ing on the Ukraine con­flict to the detri­ment of oth­er inter­na­tion­al issues.
“We should be equal­ly con­cerned at what is hap­pen­ing to the peo­ple of Pales­tine, as we are with what is hap­pen­ing to the peo­ple of Ukraine,” she said.
Blinken, for his part, under­scored that Russia’s block­ade of Ukraine’s Black Sea ports has led to scarci­ties in grain, cook­ing oil and fer­tilis­er — an issue that has had dis­pro­por­tion­ate effects on Africans.
“The US is there for African coun­tries in this unprece­dent­ed cri­sis, because that’s what part­ners do for each oth­er,” Blinken said. “The Unit­ed States will not dic­tate Africa’s choic­es, and nei­ther should any­one else. The right to make these choic­es belongs to Africans, and Africans alone.”
South Africa’s neu­tral posi­tion is large­ly because of the sup­port the Sovi­et Union gave dur­ing the Cold War era to Ramaphosa’s African Nation­al Con­gress in its fight to end apartheid – South Africa’s regime of repres­sion against the Black major­i­ty that end­ed in 1994. South Africa is seen as a leader of sev­er­al African coun­tries that will not side against Russia.
The Biden meet­ing will come at a crit­i­cal time for Ramaphosa, who is fac­ing crit­i­cism from oppo­si­tion par­ties and from with­in his own par­ty for a scan­dal over rev­e­la­tions that $4m was stolen from his cat­tle ranch.
He has been grilled this week by mem­bers of par­lia­ment about whether the for­eign cash had been prop­er­ly reg­is­tered with South Africa’s finan­cial author­i­ties and why he did not imme­di­ate­ly report the theft. The scan­dal has dam­aged Ramaphosa’s rep­u­ta­tion as a leader com­mit­ted to bat­tling his nation’s ram­pant corruption.
Ramaphosa faces sig­nif­i­cant oppo­si­tion in his efforts to be re-elect­ed as the leader of his par­ty at a con­fer­ence in Decem­ber. If he fails to win the par­ty lead­er­ship he will not be able to stand for re-elec­tion as South Africa’s pres­i­dent in 2024.
South Africa’s econ­o­my has been in reces­sion since even before the COVID-19 pan­dem­ic and a third of the coun­try is unem­ployed, so Ramaphosa would wel­come any announce­ment of eco­nom­ic sup­port from the US.
Dur­ing Blinken’s vis­it to South Africa last month, he praised South Africa and Ramaphosa for achiev­ing a mul­ti-racial democ­ra­cy after years of white minor­i­ty rule. He also used the vis­it to for­mal­ly launch a new US strat­e­gy towards sub-Saha­ran Africa.

Biden’s Africa strategy seeks to revitalize ties with the continent

https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/08/2022–08–10T131424Z_910877386_RC2PTV9ZT4SD_RTRMADP_3_USA-AFRICA-CONGO.jpg?w=270 Pres­i­dent Biden is deliv­er­ing on his com­mit­ment to make Africa a pri­or­i­ty for the Unit­ed States.  Most notable is his administration’s sharp uptick in U.S. diplo­ma­cy toward the region. With vis­its to Kenya, Nige­ria, and Sene­gal last Novem­ber, Moroc­co and Alge­ria in March, and South Africa, the Demo­c­ra­t­ic Repub­lic of the Con­go, and Rwanda…

As Europe eyes Africa’s gas reserves, environmentalists sound the alarm — Mongabay

In the wake of an ener­gy cri­sis caused by Russia’s inva­sion of Ukraine, Euro­pean coun­tries are turn­ing to Africa for its nat­ur­al gas reserves.The move is a turn­around from recent years, when many of the same coun­tries vowed to stop financ­ing fos­sil fuel projects on the continent.Some African heads of state, along with their allies in indus­try, have wel­comed the change, say­ing gas extrac­tion will help finance the tran­si­tion to renewables.But envi­ron­men­tal advo­cates on the con­ti­nent are push­ing back, say­ing that a new era of fos­sil fuel extrac­tion will cre­ate more mis­ery and harm the cli­mate. It was a vic­to­ry for African cli­mate cam­paign­ers and their allies in Europe and the Unit­ed States: a group of pow­er­ful coun­tries and insti­tu­tions includ­ing the U.S., Cana­da and the Euro­pean Invest­ment Bank announced at last year’s COP26 cli­mate sum­mit in Glas­gow, Scot­land, that they would end decades of sup­port for oil and gas projects in Africa by the end of 2022. Com­ing on the heels of a World Bank com­mit­ment to start phas­ing out sup­port for fos­sil fuels, it looked like a poten­tial death knell for plans to exploit vast quan­ti­ties of nat­ur­al gas in Sene­gal, Mozam­bique and Nigeria.
And then Rus­sia invad­ed Ukraine.
In the span of less than a year, gas projects in Africa have come back in style, as Euro­pean coun­tries scram­ble to make up for ener­gy short­falls caused by their stand­off with Rus­sia. In late May, for exam­ple, Ger­man Chan­cel­lor Olaf Scholz trav­eled to Sene­gal for talks with Pres­i­dent Macky Sall over his inter­est in secur­ing a steady sup­ply of gas from the country’s BP-backed off­shore fields. And on Aug. 16, Reuters report­ed that the EU plans to sig­nif­i­cant­ly ramp up secu­ri­ty assis­tance for Mozambique’s trou­bled Cabo Del­ga­do gas project, which in recent years has been the site of a dead­ly Islamist insur­gency and at one point not long ago was thought to be on life support.
To some African gov­ern­ments, the turn­around is wel­come, rep­re­sent­ing a need­ed course cor­rec­tion away from cli­mate restric­tions that threat­ened to block their plans to use gas reserves for eco­nom­ic devel­op­ment and boost­ing ener­gy access for the poor. In a speech at Glas­gow last year, Niger­ian Pres­i­dent Muham­madu Buhari crit­i­cized the COP26 announce­ment, and ear­li­er this year in an op-ed for The Econ­o­mist his vice pres­i­dent, Yemi Osin­ba­jo, wrote that Africa “can­not accept regres­sive cli­mate pol­i­cy as anoth­er injustice.”
Nige­ria has the continent’s largest proven nat­ur­al gas reserves, fol­lowed by Alge­ria, Sene­gal, Mozam­bique and Egypt. All are advo­cates for the use of nat­ur­al gas as a “tran­si­tion fuel,” which their lead­ers say will facil­i­tate eco­nom­ic devel­op­ment and help smooth the way for invest­ment into renew­ables like solar, wind and hydropower.
The needs are clear: access to ener­gy in Africa is far low­er than in oth­er regions. More than 600 mil­lion of the continent’s 1.3 bil­lion peo­ple live with­out elec­tric­i­ty, and despite hav­ing only one-tenth the over­all pop­u­la­tion, in 2019 Japan alone con­sumed more pow­er than all African coun­tries com­bined did.
But as their pres­i­dents ink deals behind closed doors, civ­il soci­ety orga­ni­za­tions on the con­ti­nent are push­ing back, most recent­ly at the African Union, where an “African Com­mon Posi­tion on Ener­gy Access and Tran­si­tion” call­ing for nat­ur­al gas to be part of Africa’s ener­gy strat­e­gy was adopt­ed by the AU’s Exec­u­tive Coun­cil. In an open let­ter, a coali­tion of advo­ca­cy groups said the posi­tion was “dan­ger­ous and short-sighted.”
“It makes zero sense to pur­sue new oil and gas extrac­tion, which will make the cli­mate cri­sis worse and make achiev­ing cli­mate goals impos­si­ble,” said Thandile Chinya­van­hu, a cli­mate and ener­gy cam­paign­er with Green­peace Africa. “The future is renew­able, and African coun­tries have the oppor­tu­ni­ty to lead the world into a new future pow­ered by renew­able ener­gy, leav­ing dirty fos­sil fuels in the past and in the ground.”
A ren­di­tion of plans for onshore LNG infra­struc­ture in Cabo Del­ga­do, Mozam­bique, planned for con­struc­tion by France’s TotalEnergies.
A detailed memo accom­pa­ny­ing the let­ter crit­i­cized efforts to expand gas pro­duc­tion, say­ing that addi­tion­al fos­sil fuel extrac­tion risked wors­en­ing the impacts of cli­mate change in Africa and that prof­its were like­ly to again be cap­tured pri­mar­i­ly by for­eign investors. The memo cit­ed the continent’s decades-long track record of fail­ing to devel­op through oil and gas extrac­tion, describ­ing it as “enabling small pow­er­ful elites to extract rents and main­tain eco­nom­ic and polit­i­cal con­trol, while their pop­u­la­tions lack access to ener­gy, food and oth­er essen­tial ser­vices and remain impoverished.”
“We’ve seen this in Nige­ria and African coun­tries with fos­sil fuel projects,” said Lor­raine Chipon­da, coor­di­na­tor of the Africa Coal Net­work, one of the letter’s sig­na­to­ries. “You can see the pover­ty that even the com­mu­ni­ties that live in the same areas are suf­fer­ing from, so it still doesn’t make eco­nom­ic sense.”
The letter’s authors crit­i­cized the idea that gas could be a bridge to a renew­able ener­gy grid. It was more like­ly, they wrote, that infra­struc­ture like pipelines and gas-fired pow­er plants would suck finance and atten­tion away from green energy.
Some sup­port­ers of gas projects in Africa acknowl­edge the poor track record of nat­ur­al resource extrac­tion on the con­ti­nent. In Mozam­bique, for exam­ple, the dis­cov­ery of large off­shore gas reserves was fol­lowed almost imme­di­ate­ly by a mas­sive cor­rup­tion scan­dal that impli­cat­ed senior offi­cials as well as Euro­pean bankers.
But ana­lysts like Imad Ahmed, an ener­gy and cli­mate advis­er at the Tony Blair Insti­tute for Glob­al Change, say that, with the right approach, those pri­or scan­dals could inform stronger poli­cies that ensure for­eign investors pay their fair share and avoid dam­ag­ing the environment.
“By remain­ing financiers of gas devel­op­ment, OECD nations can ensure that these good gov­er­nance struc­tures are embed­ded into con­trac­tu­al oblig­a­tions,” Ahmed told Mongabay.
Sup­port­ers of gas extrac­tion point out that African coun­tries are among the low­est per-capi­ta car­bon emit­ters on the plan­et, and that expect­ing them to for­go the use of their nat­ur­al resources to clean up a mess made large­ly by for­mer colo­nial pow­ers is inher­ent­ly hypocritical.
“The pros­per­i­ty we expe­ri­ence in Europe is on the back of his­toric emis­sions. You can’t pre­tend that it isn’t,” Ahmed said.
Envi­ron­men­tal advo­cates agree, but they say that the appro­pri­ate resti­tu­tion would be for wealth­i­er coun­tries to pro­vide the sup­port and finance for the tran­si­tion to renew­ables — as they have promised to do in the past — rather than dou­bling down on their his­to­ry of exploit­ing the continent’s resources for their own gain.
“Even before the cli­mate cri­sis, many com­mu­ni­ties and civ­il soci­ety groups in Africa and around the world were fight­ing fos­sil fuel explo­ration due to its impacts on people’s liveli­hoods and the increased pover­ty, human rights vio­la­tions, land grab­bing, and cor­rup­tion it brings,” said Anabela Lemos, founder of Mozambique’s Justiça Ambiental.
Last year, Shell agreed to pay more than $100 mil­lion in dam­ages for spilling vast quan­ti­ties of oil in the Niger Delta dur­ing the 1970s.
Whether or not wealthy coun­tries owe African coun­tries com­pen­sa­tion for cli­mate change is like­ly to be a con­tentious issue at November’s COP27 cli­mate sum­mit, which will be held in Egypt. The G7 group of rich­est coun­tries man­aged to keep the issue of “loss and dam­age” off their agen­da at ini­tial talks in Ger­many held in June, but most observers expect it to take cen­ter stage at COP27.
For many influ­en­tial heads of state and busi­ness lead­ers in Africa, the reluc­tance of rich coun­tries to pro­vide ade­quate cli­mate fund­ing to their less well-off coun­ter­parts is itself an argu­ment in favor of exploit­ing the continent’s gas reserves.
“Deny­ing Africa’s right to devel­op and use its own gas is moral­ly unac­cept­able,” said the Sudanese-British bil­lion­aire Mo Ibrahim ear­li­er this year.
Despite their rel­a­tive lack of resources and pow­er, though, African envi­ron­men­tal­ists aren’t going down with­out a fight. In the wake of the con­tro­ver­sy over the AU’s pro­posed pro-gas stance, the lead nego­tia­tors set to rep­re­sent the con­ti­nent at COP27 said they would not adopt it as their offi­cial posi­tion. It was a vic­to­ry for the anti-gas coali­tion, but advo­cates say if Europe stays on its cur­rent course, it could ush­er in a new era of fos­sil fuel extrac­tion in Africa — and make a green tran­si­tion that much harder.
“For now the deci­sion has been reject­ed, but it doesn’t mean that indi­vid­ual gov­ern­ments in Africa aren’t sign­ing deals with gov­ern­ments in Europe,” Chipon­da said. “So we have to con­tin­ue push­ing back on that.”
Ban­ner image: Ger­man Chan­cel­lor Olaf Scholz vis­its with South African Pres­i­dent Cyril Ramaphosa in May 2022. Pho­to by Stef­fen Kugler for Die Bundesregierung.

Global community urged not to let Ukraine crisis affect support for African nations

ISTANBUL The inter­na­tion­al com­mu­ni­ty has been urged to ensure that the fall­out from the Ukraine cri­sis should not have an impact on glob­al sup­port for African nations.A joint state­ment released after a meet­ing of the Forum on Chi­na-Africa Coop­er­a­tion on Thurs­day held vir­tu­al­ly and addressed by China’s For­eign Min­is­ter Wang Yi, urged the inter­na­tion­al com­mu­ni­ty to “active­ly help African coun­tries address food secu­ri­ty, cli­mate change, ener­gy cri­sis and oth­er glob­al issues.”Expressing sup­port for a peace­ful nego­ti­a­tion between Rus­sia and Ukraine, the state­ment called on the inter­na­tion­al com­mu­ni­ty not to “lev­el down sup­port and input to Africa because of the Ukraine issue.”Russia launched a war on Ukraine in Feb­ru­ary of this year, result­ing in hun­dreds of deaths on both sides and mil­lions flee­ing the coun­try, affect­ing glob­al sup­ply chains, espe­cial­ly ener­gy and food supplies.However, thanks to the efforts of Türkiye and the UN, a grain cor­ri­dor with a coor­di­na­tion cen­ter in Istan­bul has been estab­lished, allow­ing food sup­plies from Ukraine and Rus­sia to reach the rest of the world.“The two sides urge the inter­na­tion­al com­mu­ni­ty to take seri­ous­ly Africa’s con­cerns on expand­ing devel­op­ment financ­ing and pro­mot­ing eco­nom­ic recov­ery, accel­er­ate the chan­nel­ing of Spe­cial Draw­ing Rights, in a bid to help Africa achieve inde­pen­dent and sus­tain­able devel­op­ment,” the state­ment said.Wang told the forum that Chi­na sup­ports the African side in imple­ment­ing the “Silenc­ing the Guns” ini­tia­tive as the two sides not­ed that the world is fac­ing grow­ing secu­ri­ty chal­lenges, con­demn­ing all forms of ter­ror­ism and vio­lent extremism.Reciprocal sup­port­Reaf­firm­ing their com­mit­ment to the prin­ci­ple of non-inter­fer­ence in inter­nal affairs, the Chi­nese side urged the inter­na­tion­al com­mu­ni­ty to “pro­vide finan­cial and tech­ni­cal sup­port to counter-ter­ror­ism oper­a­tions led by Africa in accor­dance with the mech­a­nisms of the African Peace and Secu­ri­ty Architecture.”Expressing sup­port to uphold the pur­pos­es and prin­ci­ples of the UN-cen­tered inter­na­tion­al sys­tem, the state­ment urged uphold­ing “equal­i­ty among all coun­tries regard­less of their size, strength and wealth.”Without men­tion­ing any coun­try, the two sides opposed uni­lat­er­al­ism, pow­er pol­i­tics, racial dis­crim­i­na­tion, the for­ma­tion of oppos­ing blocs, and divi­sion and confrontation.The state­ment reaf­firmed their mutu­al sup­port for ter­ri­to­r­i­al integri­ty, sov­er­eign­ty, secu­ri­ty, and devel­op­ment inter­ests, say­ing “there is but one Chi­na in the world … Tai­wan is an inalien­able part of China’s ter­ri­to­ry, and the gov­ern­ment of the People’s Repub­lic of Chi­na is the sole legal gov­ern­ment rep­re­sent­ing the whole of China.”“The African side reaf­firms its com­mit­ment to the one-Chi­na prin­ci­ple, and its sup­port for China’s nation­al reuni­fi­ca­tion and China’s efforts to safe­guard the sov­er­eign­ty and ter­ri­to­r­i­al integri­ty,” it added.China and African nations also said they will con­tin­ue to fight COVID-19 with “sol­i­dar­i­ty, deep­en prac­ti­cal coop­er­a­tion, pro­mote green devel­op­ment, uphold equi­ty and justice.”According to the state­ment, the two sides will syn­er­gize China’s mul­ti-bil­lion-dol­lar Belt and Road Ini­tia­tive, the Glob­al Devel­op­ment Ini­tia­tive with the African Union’s Agen­da 2063, and nation­al devel­op­ment strate­gies of African coun­tries, “in order to ele­vate Chi­na-Africa coop­er­a­tion to high­er levels.”

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African art: One London museum’s agreement to return colonial artefacts could open the … — iNews

In April 1897, Fred­er­ick Horn­i­man, at the time Britain’s wealth­i­est tea trad­er and an avid col­lec­tor, was offered an oppor­tu­ni­ty he could not refuse. Through “estab­lished com­mer­cial sources and pri­vate col­lec­tions” he acquired 12 items of what was referred to as “Benin mate­r­i­al” for the mod­est sum of £30. Horn­i­man, a Quak­er whose par­ents had been part of the anti-slav­ery move­ment and who as a Lib­er­al MP cam­paigned for what became the wel­fare state, had become almost cer­tain­ly the first per­son in Britain to pur­chase items stolen bare­ly weeks ear­li­er from Benin City in an 18-day ram­page by 5,000 British troops sent to sack one of West Africa’s fore­most civil­i­sa­tions. Upon its return to the UK, the booty from the open­ly puni­tive raid was sold, both offi­cial­ly by the For­eign Office to recov­er the cost of the mil­i­tary oper­a­tion, and unof­fi­cial­ly by the troops them­selves, a num­ber of whom had been suf­fi­cient­ly com­fort­able with their loot­ing in present-day Nige­ria to be pho­tographed beside their hauls. Gen­tle­man afi­ciona­dos such as Horn­i­man would have been the sub­ject of many offers from these “pri­vate col­lec­tions” and in the next two years, the tea trad­er con­tin­ued to acquire 60 more objects emp­tied from the Benin citadel, among them orna­men­tal plaques telling sto­ries of trib­al his­to­ry and a key to the palace of the Oba, or king. Worth mil­lions but acquired for the equiv­a­lent of a few thou­sand pounds of mod­ern mon­ey, these “Benin bronzes” were put on dis­play among thou­sands of oth­er arte­facts in Horniman’s pala­tial home in the plush south Lon­don sub­urb of For­est Hill. Short­ly after 1901 a pur­pose-built muse­um on the site was bequeathed by the mag­nate to the then Lon­don Coun­ty Coun­cil for the “recre­ation, instruc­tion and enjoy­ment” of the capital’s pop­u­lace. Horniman’s goal, as he saw it, of “bring­ing the world” to a sub­ur­ban cor­ner of the British empire’s cap­i­tal was com­plete. A cen­tu­ry or so lat­er, the museum’s trustees, required to over­see and shape Horniman’s increas­ing­ly thorny lega­cy, this week record­ed anoth­er first in his name. More on British Muse­u­mAfter a two-year process of con­sul­ta­tion and eval­u­a­tion, it was announced that the 72 Benin bronzes are to be returned to Nige­ria, mak­ing the Horn­i­man the first major muse­um direct­ly fund­ed by the Depart­ment for Cul­ture, Media and Sport to under­take such a large-scale act of resti­tu­tion of colo­nial-era plun­der. The pledge to return the items was made all the more sig­nif­i­cant by the unvar­nished recog­ni­tion of wrong­do­ing that accom­pa­nied it. Eve Salomon, chair of the Horniman’s trustees said: “The evi­dence is very clear that these objects were acquired through force… It is both moral and appro­pri­ate to return their own­er­ship to Nige­ria.” Oth­er British insti­tu­tions have pre­vi­ous­ly under­tak­en small­er returns of Benin arte­facts, led by Aberdeen Uni­ver­si­ty and Jesus Col­lege, Cam­bridge last year. But there is a grow­ing view that the Horn­i­man Museum’s deci­sion – along­side a sim­i­lar announce­ment last week by Oxford and Cam­bridge uni­ver­si­ties to seek the return of 200 items to Nige­ria – is a water­shed moment in a resti­tu­tion cam­paign which has seen the slow ero­sion of a decades-long refusal by cul­tur­al insti­tu­tions (the UK hold­ings of Benin bronzes are held by 150 sep­a­rate bod­ies) to con­tem­plate the sur­ren­der of ill-got­ten gains. It is a fact which bears rep­e­ti­tion that near­ly 90 per cent of major African works of art and arte­facts are held out­side Africa, most of them in Europe.

The New U.S. Africa Strategy Breaks From the Status Quo-With Some Perplexing Stumbles

On Mon­day, U.S. Sec­re­tary of State Antony Blinken intro­duced the Biden administration’s much-await­­ed strat­e­gy for Africa. Speak­ing in South Africa, dur­ing his sec­ond trip to the con­ti­nent in less than a year, Blinken out­lined the pol­i­cy against a back­drop of the pan­dem­ic, the war in Ukraine, and a glob­al eco­nom­ic slow­down. Although some­what com­pa­ra­ble to…

In the Kenyan Election, a Fierce Battle to Lead an African Powerhouse

https://static01.nyt.com/images/2022/08/04/world/00kenya-election-promo/00kenya-election-promo-moth.jpg Kenyans vote for a new pres­i­dent on Tues­day, end­ing a heat­ed race that shows why, in a trou­bled region, the East African nation mat­ters more than ever. KANGARI, Kenya — The heli­copter swooped over the lush tea and cof­fee fields flank­ing Mount Kenya, Africa’s sec­ond high­est peak, and touched down out­side a small high­land town…

U.S. Embassies in Africa Are Chronically Short-Staffed

https://foreignpolicy.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/07/Blinken-Africa-Embassies-GettyImages-1236657472.jpg U.S. embassies across Africa are fac­ing chron­ic staffing short­ages that are under­cut­ting U.S. for­eign-pol­i­­cy goals on the con­ti­nent and sap­ping the morale of the diplo­mat­ic corps, accord­ing to inter­views with mul­ti­ple U.S. offi­cials and region­al experts. The prob­lem has caught the atten­tion of top U.S. law­mak­ers, who have raised alarm bells about the long-term…

Dead but Not Buried, Angola’s Ex-President’s Body Sparks a Continental Fight

https://static01.nyt.com/images/2022/07/14/world/14angola-dossantos1/14angola-dossantos1-moth.jpg José Eduar­do dos San­tos ruled Ango­la for 38 years. But he died in Spain. A dis­pute over where to lay him to rest has divid­ed his fam­i­ly and could decide the fate of his polit­i­cal par­ty. LUANDA, Ango­la — Even in death, Angola’s long­time ruler, José Eduar­do dos San­tos, is at the cen­ter of political…